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Before embarking upon his authorship Kierkegaard undertook exhaustive 
studies of the problems concerning language and communication, this with 
an eye towards arriving at a medium of expression in which content and form 
would embody a close interrelationship, and at a terminology that would not 
engender ambiguity. As a result of these efforts the various terms and 
expressions permeating his authorship shows a remarkable consistency in 
meaning and application — even when Kierkegaard does not himself supply 
us with a definition — as indeed this was essential to his entire production, or, 
as Lars Bejerholm puts it: »S. K.’s reflections concerning languages de­
signatory function are in this respect [ “That terms contain an unequivocal 
designation”] a systematic presupposition for his theories of communication,”1 
and when one reflects that the entire authorship constitutes a communication it 
becomes understandable that his systematic use of language likewise must 
rest as the foundation for the authorship itself.
The question of communication, especially of indirect communication, as 
well as the specific problems relevant to many Kierkegaardian categories, 
cannot in their full breadth concern us here, partially because a good portion 
of this work has already been done, partially because such an undertaking 
in an essay would be ridiculous, and principally because our concern here is 
what has happened to Kierkegaard in English. Hence, we shall, in the 
following, limit ourselves to a few general remarks with respect to trans­
lating and to defining from a linguistic standpoint — to the extent that that 
be possible — a few of those terms which cronically have given rise to 
translatorial headaches.
The first difficulty facing the translator consists not necessarily in know­
ledge of the two languages involved — that is assumed — but in a com­
prehension of the authors perhaps especial use and significance of key
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expressions and terms which are likely to be found throughout the entire 
authorship, for these will be the terms providing us with an entrance card for 
admission to his thought. This difficulty will now be compounded by several 
factors. For the first, the very fact that there are two languages involved, next 
the period during which the author wrote (languages are subject to change), 
then the author’s sources and background, and finally the specific intention 
of the author.
If, bearing this in mind, we now turn to Kierkegaard, we must first note 
that his production took place in the early nineteenth century, at a time 
when the Danish orthography was not yet fixed,2 and when the Danish 
language contained many words and expressions which have since either 
disappeared completely or undergone radical modifications in meaning. Be­
cause Kierkegaard very frequently made use of colloquial expressions, under­
standing some of his nineteenth-century, Copenhagen slang, and any hope of 
following in English, let us say, his Danish style will necessitate studies of 
the language of that period,3 and consequently the use of Danish dictionaries 
of that age.
Secondly, and most important, the philosophic terminology of Kierke­
gaard’s time had but recently been imported into Danish, principally via 
literal translation from German, more specifically, from the Speculative 
Idealism raging at the time (according to some, to the detriment of Danish4), 
and this importation was of considerable significance for scientific usage in 
Denmark. However, Kierkegaard did not simply, without further ado, take 
over an entire Hegelian terminology; Hegel’s terms and categories were 
drastically reworked by Kierkegaard so as in many instances to acquire a 
significance quite at variance from that employed in speculation. The content 
of many of Kierkegaard’s concepts represents a radical departure from 
traditional usage, for the simple fact that Kierkegaard’s thinking likewise 
constituted a break with tradition, which is to say that he encountered a 
difficulty to which every genius who has imparted something new has been 
exposed.
To this must be added the very nature of the Danish language, in particular 
when set into contrast to English with the latter’s admixture of two disparate 
language-groups, the Teutonic and the Romance. Belonging to the Teutonic
group, many Danish words possess an extremely broad meaning, or several 
meanings, in some cases contradictory ones (the famous at ophœve — to 
preserve or to abrogate). What one author,5 in comparing ancient Greek to 
modern Western languages, said of German is to some extent attributable to 
Danish as well: “The imprecision and lack of immediate perspicuity into 
which English occasionally deviates and from which German occasionally 
emerges, is quite foreign to Greek/* The English reader can find examples 
of this ambiguousness in his own language, merely by comparing many of 
our synonyms, where those of Germanic origin generally have a broader sense 
while those of French derivation tend to bring definitions into narrower 
confines.
To all of this must be added the complications arising when an attempt is 
made at translating thought from one language into another, especially if two 
languages do not have an immediate kinship. That Kierkegaard himself was 
aware of this fact is evident from a rather interesting entry in the Papers,G 
where he remarks that in ancient times, when only one language was used for 
literature, there existed a fixed terminology which, with the later employment 
of national languages and the emergence of the concomitant differences in 
nuances contained in variegating modes of expressing the concepts, has since 
disappeared and been rendered impossible.
This question of terminology was for Kierkegaard of itself an essential 
point for debate with speculative philosophy. It was his view that the philo­
sophers of his age had brought all definitions to confusion, chiefly by em­
ploying the same terms in different disciplines, thereby denuding the former 
of any consistency in content and of the power of conviction, while at the 
same time rendering it impossible to distinguish between the sciences.7 The 
result of their emasculation of the concepts was the aestheticizing of religion 
(in particular of the religious address).8 The problem then is to translate 
without reverting to the same confusion.
With this as a backdrop, let us now take a look at how Kierkegaard has 
fared in English. The history of Kierkegaard’s entrance into the English 
language is supplied — at least in part — by Walter Lowrie in an article 
entitled “How Kierkegaard Got into English”,9 a rather revelatory piece of
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work. At first, one cannot but be impressed by “the indefatigable Dr. Walter 
Lowries’”10 ardor in organizing and arranging for funds — and even himself 
defraying costs where necessary — for the purpose of introducing Kierkegaard 
to the English reader; without the expenditure of this energy a good portion 
of Kierkegaard’s works might still be unknown to the English speaking 
world. But in another and more important department, that of translating, 
his quest to break all existing speed records11 is most decidedly to be deplored, 
for this fact alone has most certainly lain at the bottom of many glaring 
inconsistencies, which, combined with a lack in English of the most im­
portant of Kierkegaard’s journal entries, have gone far to hamper both 
American and British scholarship. This, then, brings us to the purpose of the 
essay, to wit, a closer look at those words and expression which in the past 
have been the cause not only of difficulties but also of a departure from 
Kierkegaard’s terminology.
Virkeligheden: Until Howard Hong’s revision of the Fragments appeared, 
it had been the custom to render this word by both ‘reality’ and ‘actuality’, 
with the former predominating by far.
The Virkelighed employed by Kierkegaard is in fact Hegel’s Wirklichkeit, 
but with a sense far more profound than that found in, f. i., Hegel’s Logic, 
and never in the more general sense of ‘reality’ (Dan: Realitet, Ger.Realitdt). 
The latter is used by Kierkegaard in the sense of validity, as in the validity 
or reality of thought,12 which is a far cry from the more concrete actuality 
with which he was occupied. Reality for Kierkegaard lacks the phenomenal 
side and is indifferent to time, and consequently to motion.
For Kierkegaard, actuality always includes the contingent and the element 
of time, it being a composite of two otherwise incompatible elements, the 
necessary or intellectual aspect and the phenomenal. His concept af actuality 
fits closely into the pattern laid down by Aristotle in his Categories and Meta­
physics. Since, however, the actuality with which Kierkegaard principally is 
concerned is that of an existing human being, his concept always involves a 
doubleness that accentuates the element of time. Having come into existence, 
and thus now partaking of time and occupying space, he is, in an empirical 
sense, of course an actual human being. However, in addition to this there is
the problem of individuation, that of existentially actualizing (or taking over) 
the personality as conceived, but principally as conceived as an obligation. 
Into this pattern are fitted the ideas of repetition and faith. This double aspect 
of actuality has been most succinctly expressed by Dr. Malantschuk as 
follows:13 “If, then, there were to be given an actual-being of such a nature 
that behind its phenomenal being it were to contain not only the thereto 
corresponding conceptual side — in accordance with the basic presuppositions 
for truth and actuality — but if behind this phenomenal appearance’s actuality 
with its conceptual aspect still another actual-being could conceal itself, that 
again were to possess both real and ideal aspects, and in addition to this were 
to lay claim to eternal existence, then we would be faced with an entirely 
new form of actual-being.” This concept goes far beyond that of Hegel, but 
in a completely different direction, for Hegel culminates in fact by 
transcending actuality.
The translators clue here is, however, the usage employed — and 
consistently — in the English versions of Hegel’s works, and especially in his 
Logic. The Hegelian category at which Kierkegaard is persistently aiming is 
that of Actuality,14 and not Reality,15 the latter having represented for Hegel 
a quite different stage in the development of thought. Further, the basic 
schema stems from investigations of both Aristotle and Plato, and in both 
these instances it has been customary to employ the more concrete ‘actuality’.
As things now stand, it is an extremely knotty undertaking, that of 
differentiating in the English translations between these two notions, for they 
have been utilized interchangeably, with the result that only by studying the 
context are we able to distinguish between them. In the Postscript16 the terms 
‘validity’, ‘reality’ and ‘actuality’ have been freely intermingled, while in The 
Concept of Dread17 and in Stages on Life’s Way ‘reality’ has been made to 
serve as a translation for both Virkelighed and Realitet, and that in successive 
passages in which the contexts could not possibly permit of such.
Throughout, ‘reality’ and ‘actuality’ are employed as synonyms in the 
English translations, and yet this is not the case, even from the point of view 
of English etymology and definition. ‘Reality’, of French and Latin origin, 
expresses primarily a relation or correspondance between appearance and 
essence , viz., the present state or condition of things as perceived in a repre-
sentation so vivid as almost to imbue the representation with concrete 
existence or to confuse it with the concrete object represented. In its etymo­
logical meaning the word pertains to things in law, hence the modern sense 
of genuine, valid. ‘Actuality’, on the other hand, always infers a phenomenal, 
present existence in time18 and in contradistinction to what is potential or 
possible. Its original meaning was act or present existence (it is interesting to 
observe that the modern French actuel means current, and the modern Danish 
aktuel ‘of current interest, topical’).
Here, then, there can be no doubt; Virkeligheden must be rendered by 
‘actuality’ if one is not to run the risk of emasculating one of Kierkegaard’s 
most important concepts, to say nothing of confusing two entirely different 
terms.
Forstand: This word was the subject of no small amount of correspondance 
between Swenson and Lowrie,19 and well it might have been, for between 
the Danish Fornuft and Forstand, on the one side, and the English reason 
and understanding, on the other, there exists no direct concordance, while, 
to add to the complication, Kierkegaard has dismissed as invalid an entire 
philosophic tradition calling for a differentiation in gradation between under­
standing and reason (or Forstand and Fornuft). Moreover, the two Danish 
words (like the English) are used idiomatically in a myriad of combinations, 
each of which strays quite far from the significances of the two words proper. 
It would seem, judging from the aforementioned reference and from remarks 
appearing in Lowries Forword to the Postscript, that Swenson and Lowrie 
engaged in a heated debate on this subject, with Swenson preferring ‘Reason’ 
as a translation of Forstand, whereas Lowrie held tenaciously to ‘Under­
standing’. Swenson’s thinking in this respect is available to us, as is an 
indication of Lowrie’s,20 but the full exposition of the latter’s grounds for his 
choice remains buried in a bundle of correspondance now reposing at the 
University of Minnesota.21
The distinction between perception, understanding and reason (Ger.: Ver­
st and and Vernunft, respectively, for the last two) owes its principal elu­
cidation, of course, to Kant’s epistemology, in particular as developped in The 
Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant (we leave perception out of the picture
here), understanding is a “faculty of rules” whose function consists in a 
synthesizing of perception and conception so as to arrive at judgements that 
yield the categories, or abstracts of experience; reason, by contrast, in addition 
to providing the interconnection between the understanding’s separate, con­
ditioned results, is also itself a source of conceptions furnishing universal pro­
positions or “principles”.22 In essence, Hegel had appropriated this distinction. 
For Hegel, understanding deals with ‘limited’ abstractions, namely, it holds 
fast to antitheses between universals and particulars and is consequently unable 
to transcend the principle of contradiction. Reason occupies a much more 
eminent position, for in the culmination of the logical system it becomes 
identified with spirit, the notion, where all contradictions have been reconciled 
and surmounted, and where reason as a productive faculty brings forth and 
identifies itself with actuality.23
Kierkegaard rejects completely this division of the cognitive powers, and 
in fact often uses Forstand and Fornuft as synonyms.24 Firstly, there could be 
no such thing as an intellectual faculty capable of validly reconciling 
existential contradictions, since the contradictions with which he was occupied 
were absolute or qualitative; quite the contrary, it is precisely reason’s inability 
to despatch them that brings about its downfall (and herein lies also the 
absolute character of the Paradox), the contradiction consisting in the fact 
that there is to be brought into existence a relation to a something that defies 
thought, but which the reason nevertheless will think.
Furthermore, reason for Kierkegaard implies some elements which Hegel 
most certainly would have regarded as a serious detriment to all thinking. 
Nowhere does Kierkegaard give us a dictionary-definition, but what it in­
volves may be inferred from its use within the authorship. The first concrete 
indication is found in the Fragments25 and an excellent summary of reason’s 
employment here is provided by Swenson’s note to the first edition (retained 
in Dr. Thulstrup’s second edition):26 Reason “is not” , quoting Swenson, “to 
be taken in any abstract-intellectual sense, but quite concretely, as the 
reflectively organized common sense of mankind, including as its essential 
core a sense of life’s values. Over against the ‘Paradox’, it is therefore the 
self-assurance and self-assertiveness of man’s nature in its totality. To identify 
it with any abstract intellectual function, like the function of scientific
cognition, or of general ideas, or of the a priori, or of self-consistency in 
thinking, etc., is wholly to misunderstand the exposition of the Fragments. 
Specifically, Kant’s distinction between Reason and Understanding, or any 
other similar distinction [f. i., Hegel’s] is wholly beside the point. The Danish 
word here translated is Forstanden, but this should not mislead anyone into 
thinking that it ought to be translated by ‘Understanding’ and interpreted in 
contradistinction to ‘Reason’.”27 If this definition now be supplemented with 
a few deatils, such as the fact that the reason can despair (SV VII, p. 210 
note), that the despairing individual employs a part of his reason to explain 
away the other part’s despair (211), and that the reason acts with passion 
(SV IV, p. 242), then it becomes evident that with Kierkegaard’s usage we 
are dealing with something entirely new. To be sure, Forstand represents for 
Kierkegaard the objective moment in a human’s composition, yet this is not 
a disconnected entity or activity whose sole function consists in a neat ar­
rangement of the categories or in a cogitation devoid of subjective content, 
but it entails rather a thinking whose source of energy derives from an 
infinite interest connecting the subject and the objective, and whose material, 
provided both by experience and by imagination, is resolved into a possible 
intended for actualization. Reason does not and cannot do away with 
existential contradictions, which in themselves furnish an additional tension. 
Per Lønning has quite rightly called this “tenkningen som lidenskap” .28
What, then, are we to do in English (my own predilection is already quite 
obvious)? There are two basic problems; first, the special use within specula­
tive .philosophy and, second, the colloquial uses of the various terms available 
to us. The first could most certainly constitute a serious objection to the use 
of ‘reason’, for it is to be feared that a reader acquainted with the English 
versions of Hegel’s and Kant’s works — or of those philosophers who separate 
them — might go so far as to identify Kierkegaard’s concept with the higher 
instrument of thought as defined by the former two philosophers. Granted 
that such a mistake must of necessity be based either on a superficial reading 
of Kierkegaard, or on the accident that the reader is excessively taken up 
with and pre-inclined by speculative thought (which possibility is rapidly 
dwindling), yet the constant appearance of such a word in critical passages 
does give the problem an element of reality. But, by the same token (and
Swenson has pointed this out in the correspondance referred to above), the 
employment of ‘understanding’ is equally liable to engender the same dif­
ficulty, only in the opposite direction (and apparently already has. Cf. Gare- 
lick: the offence [committed by Christianity” ] to the heart follows from
the shock to the understanding and the rejection of reason.”29 Garelick has 
throughout employed ‘reason’ as the faculty in question, despite the fact that 
‘understanding’ appears in the Postspript). We have, therefore, no way via 
translation of circumnavigating this little issue.
The next to which we should turn our attention is colloquial usage (which, 
by the way, is an aspect that Kierkegaard always took into account). In Swen­
son’s letter mentioned above he gives us examples of common usages of 
Forstand og Aabenbarelse (Swenson actually uses the Swedish Forstandet och 
Uppenbarelse) as against “Reason and Revelation” , a poignant observation, 
for we no more oppose ‘understanding’ and revelation than do the Danes 
Fornuft and Aabenbarelse. In general use, the two Danish words in fact have 
meanings opposite to those one might expect, Forstand inclining more towards 
the intellectual, and Fornuft towards the reasonable or common sense. A 
fornuftig person is one who is reasonable, while a forstandig individual is 
sensible or intelligent.
The English equivalents pose similar problems, albeit with shades of 
differences. Understanding is generally used to indicate the positive result of 
a reflective process, or in the sense of a knowing or intelligent person — or 
even a person sympathetic to the cares of others — but it is in the significance 
as comprehension, apprehension, that my chief objection to utilization of 
understanding as a translation of Forstand lies, since in Kierkegaard’s works, 
and particularly in the Fragments and Postscript, the latter word is frequently 
placed side by side with the precise Danish equivalent of understanding, namely, 
Forstaaelse, and it is not always that we are able to circumvent muddiness by 
substituting English synonyms. By way of example let one just translate the 
following from the Fragments (SV IV, p. 242), but in following Lowrie’s 
wishes: “Dersom Paradoxet og Forstanden støde sammen i den fælleds For­
staaelse, da er Sammenstødet lykkeligt som Elskovens Forstaaelse, . . . ” and: 
“Er Sammenstødet ikke i Forstaaelse, da er Forholdet ulykkeligt, og denne 
Forstandens, om jeg saa tør sige, . . .” With such examples it is not hard to
imagine the possible result, while the Postscript, in which ‘understanding’ 
does the job of ‘Reason’ in the Fragments, does indeed offer us some fine 
examples.
Lowrie has at any rate been constant to his preference for ‘understanding’, 
whereas Swenson, after having employed ‘Reason’ in the Fragments, then 
reverted to Lowrie’s favorite in the bulk of his portion of the Postscript, not 
without, however, falling back in a few instances to ‘reason’ (this time without 
a capital ‘R’); Prof. Hong, in his revision of the Fragments, retained both 
‘Reason’ and (as mentioned above) Swenson’s already cited note, but now, 
with his translation of the Papers his (Hong’s) choice has again fallen upon 
‘understanding’. What the outcome of all this will be is difficult to say, for 
Lee Capel, in his recent translation of The Concept of Irony,30 divides his 
glosary into two compartments, those having a “one-to-one correspondance” 
and those which cannot readily be directly translated, offering, as they do, 
difficulties; peculiarly enough, Forstand and Fornuft have been placed in the 
first category. Forstand — understanding; Fornuft = reason. With this, we 
seem almost to have relapsed into the speculative distinctions ...
Anfægtelse: This word is perhaps the worst of them all, there existing in 
English not even an approximation to it in meaning, while it nevertheless 
constitutes an important category in Kierkegaard’s religious thinking..
Defined by a Danish dictionary of Kierkegaard’s time,31 at anfægte has the 
following meaning: “ 1. Actually to assault with arms, but used [in this sense] 
figuratively only. At anfegtes (to be tempted [fristes]) by the Devil; an- 
fegtes (to be insulted) with respect to one's honor; anfegtes (to be plagued) 
by sufferings, by severe illness. The son’s misfortune does not anfegte(r) him 
(it does not touch him, he does not take it seriously, to heart). Anfegtelse, en. 
Temptation [Fristelse] uneasiness anxiety of the mind.” {Anfegtelse is an 
older spelling).
Kierkegaard has offered no few pages to this term, f. i.; SV II, pp. 135 ff; 
III, pp. 117 ff., 346 ff.; VII, pp. 448 ff.; Pap. VIII1 A 93; IX A 392, X1 A 
452, 477, 478 — to mention but the most important. His clearest definition 
is given in the Postscript itself (SV VII, pp. 448 ff.). The distinction between 
anfægtelse and temptation (Fristelse) lies basically in that the former emanates
from the higher, the latter from the lower. Put into more concrete terms, it 
is the feeling of doubt incurred by the thought that over against God one has 
gone too far and ought now to turn back to a lower sphere, thus in the last 
instance rejecting the final leap of faith. This brings with it an incom­
prehensible suffering, for it seems as though the concept of God itself has 
brought about the suffering, which, assuming a profound love for God, must 
entail a collision whose solution cannot be sought rationally. Temptation 
inhers in the ethical stage, and here the enticing is always the lower; an­
fægtelse appertains, on the other hand, to the religious where the individual 
has discovered, through his efforts at relating himself absolutely to the abso­
lute, a limit where his reason collides with his will so that he is frightened 
back; if he gives in, he will most certainly content himself with the ethical, 
the universal, in which he would be prone to find his comfort. In anfægtelse 
there is incurred no guilt, which is of course not the case with temptation.
Another form of anfægtelse might be found in the (rare) case of an 
individual who extends himself too far into the spiritual, to the point of 
desiring to be pure spirit, while at the same time exacting of God the requisite 
assistance (this hypothetical case is extremely dialectical, for it could also be 
a form of pride). Here the solution rests, not of course in renouncing his love 
for God, and the concomitant suffering, but in bringing himself to a realiza­
tion that he is, after all, situated in time and as such is not entitled to make 
absurd claims upon himself. This case (described in X1 A 452) most certainly 
has a direct relationship to Kierkegaard himself. Abraham is the repre­
sentative in the authorship of an individual who has had to wrest himself from 
the snares of anfægtelse, which would force him to save his son and bend 
himself to the ethical.
The various and sundry English expression that have been coined to cover 
this word, trial by temptation, etc., just do not help at all and are, if anything, 
distracting. Swenson finally found himself obliged to incorporate into Eng­
lish a foreign word (when he arrived at the decisive part of the Postscript, 
pp. 410 ff.), viz., Anfechtung, the German equivalent. The problem now 
boils down to one of pronunciation. Much as I should always hesitate to 
import into English foreign, unknown words, the lack in this instance is so 
glaring that is becomes a necessity, but Anfechtung, when it pops up in the
middle of an English sentence, brings with it the savor of an unpleasant, 
contagious disease, for which reason the Danish anfægtelse, which at least is 
pronouncable in English, is much to be preferred. Whatever be the choice, 
let it be hoped that in future revisions and translations the cumbersome and 
meaningsless expressions hitherto employed will be discarded.
Tilværelse, at være til, at være; Existents, at exist ere; Tilblivelse, at blive 
til, at blive: Many words and much ink have been expended in an effort to 
arrive at a rendering in English of the subtle but significant nuances 
separating some of these expressions, and at an accurate interpretation of the 
third group. Since all of them in one way or another have to do with existence, 
I have lumped them together, but with three subdivisions: those deriving 
from the copulative ‘ to be’ (at være), ‘existence’ and ‘to exist’, and lastly, 
those originating from the auxiliary verb ‘to become’ (at blive).
The copulative verb at være is in itself no problem, but as soon as ktiT 
is added we are in trouble, since we immediately find that our English 
vocabulary does not stretch far enough to equate with both at være til and 
at existere, and worse, we have no word or expression to render satisfactorily 
Tilværelse or at være til. Tilværelse is defined by Molbech’s dictionary 
mentioned above (col. 1213) as “a thing’s being, not alone in thought or in 
the idea, but in the real, in actuality (existence).” But then it continues with: 
“to have a pitiful Tilværelse (to live a pitiful life).” Tilværelsen, if used in 
a more general sense, gives a representation of the actual, persisting world 
with all its contingencies, attributes, etc., but it gives us a rather static picture. 
When applied to an individual it usually refers to his present life or welfare 
and is almost invariably — in colloquial usage — employed in such a manner 
as to indicate just how things stand with that person. A sentence such as “ jeg 
er til for din skyld” would best be translated by “I am here (or exist) for 
your sake” .32 Existents, by contrast, brings us to the idea of being situated in 
time and space and thus accentuating motion as one of its essential in- 
grediences; it has, so to speak, more breadth or extention, or, in Kierkegaard’s 
terminology — since the existence with which he is concerned is that of a human 
being — it implicates becoming or change. Beyond this the category of 
existence does not go: “Nothing historical can be indifinitely certain for me
except the fact that I exist [er til] . . .  which is not something historical.”33 
“When it is the case that he, actually existing, constantly reproduces in his 
existence the form of existence [Tilvcerelsens Form], then as existing he is con­
stantly just as negative as positive,...; ”34 and: ‘‘Sin is the new existence-medium. 
Aside from this, to exist means merely that the individual, by having come into 
existence, exists [er til] and is in the process of becoming;... aside from this to 
exist is not a more sharply defining predicate, but the form of all the more sharply 
defining predicates.. .”35 To be noted in these passages is the differentiation 
made between existence as constituting mere presence in time and as being 
subjoined to form (.Tilvcerelse), on the one hand, and existence inclusive of a 
process of becoming (er i V or den) on the other; the first expresses nothing 
historical (other than the fact that a coming-into-existence has taken place), 
while the second intimates the individual’s historicity, viz., his ‘process of 
becoming’. At vcere til does yield the notion of a time-space existence (and to 
that extent it differs radically from the copulative ‘to be’), of the presence of 
an existent, and as such may be said to be a ‘static’ concept, to wit, static in 
contradistinction to ‘to exist’ which gives a sense of continuity.
Unfortunately, we have no definite means of rendering this distinction in 
English, apart, that is, from the expedient of resorting to substitutes such as 
reality, presence, etc. (which Swenson and Lowrie have done), but even with 
the ingenuity shown in this respect by our translators the full thought never 
quite comes through to the surface in English.
Tilblivelse and at blive til present the above situation in reverse; it is not 
possible in Danish to differentiate between ‘to come into being’ and ‘to come 
into existence’, the two Danish terms above having to serve for both. Until 
the advent of Kierkegaard’s works this problem (as well as many others) was 
not to acute, but now where precision is required and with stress having been 
placed on existence and on an absolutely paradoxical form of generation, we 
become obliged to settle this question if we are to produce a faithful repro­
duction in English of Kierkegaard’s thought, especially since the category of 
change (Forandring) is pivotal in his thinking. Heretofore (with the exception 
of Prof. Hong’s revision of the Fragments), a maze of expressions have been 
drawn upon, with ‘coming-into-being’ and ‘to come into being’, respectively, 
as the most preferred.
In the Fragments, Prof. Hong was concerned with one kind of change, that 
of coming into existence in the sense of generation,36 especially with respect 
to the Eternal in time, i. e., “not the Eternal as coming into being but as 
coming into temporal-spatial existence with its particularity and contingency: 
the Incarnation.”37 Prof. Hong having already covered this point, I shall here 
confine myself to a few remarks relevant to change as applied in the Post­
script, and as delineated more concretely in The Sickness Unto Death.
In these two works, the central issue is that of bringing into existence a 
contemplated actuality, i. e., of actualizing a possibility, which though having 
existence yet does not have existence for the individual until it has been given 
concretion through an act of the will. In Either ¡Or this receives the following 
expression:38 “The choice here makes two dialectical movements at one time; 
that which is chosen does not exist \_er ikke tiT\ and comes into existence by 
means of the choice; what is chosen exists [er t il \ , otherwise it would not 
be a choice.” This movement is from actuality possibility -> actuality, and 
the actuality under discussion is in inwardness — which again brings us back 
to the observations made under “Virkeligheden”, and to the quotation 
borrowed from Dr. Malantschuk. In both the changes involved here, and in 
the qualitative change indigenous to the act of believing, there occurs yet 
another change, a transformation of the individual’s entire existence, hence 
a qualitative change copresent with that of coming into existence.
In The Sickness Unto Death (and in Either ¡Or), that which must come into 
existence for the already existing individual is the selv as posited under 
the category of necessity whose possibility lies in the choice of possessing and 
thus giving it actuality. But the ultimate actuality consists in the act of faith, 
i. e., in a rebirth; here again, another qualitative change.
The simultaneous changes which here take place, or the transformations 
within a transformation, are perhaps better expressed by the Danish Tilbli- 
velse with its ambiguity than by the more exact English, but even in this 
instance we must give actuality and existence their due — hence, ‘come into 
existence’.
Angest: The difficulty with this word, especially as employed by Kierkegaard, 
lies in its wide application as opposed to the more precise terms available to
us in the Romance languages. By Molbech Angest is defined thusly:39 uAngest, 
en. Actually anxiety or oppression, pressure on the heart; but used only for: 
a high degree of fear for or worry over a forthcoming or immanent danger.” 
For Kierkegaard the essential difference between Angest and fear (Frygt) 
consists in the fact that the former requires no object, whereas the latter does, 
which determination likewise equates with colloquial usage (this is not to say 
that Angest cannot be directed to a known, concrete object). Unlike the 
definition quoted above, Angest can, within its qualitative determination, also 
undergo quantitative changes in gradation. It is for this reason that he can 
speak of an Angest that is “friendly and mild”, or of a “sweet anxiety”.40
‘Dread’, by contrast, is crushing in its implications, and is certainly at the 
root of the many accusations made against “existential philosophy” for being 
extremely pessimistic (Sartre’s school has helped, of course), as dread generally 
requires a known object and always signifies a fear raised to its utmost 
intensity. It its indeed a shame that the first translations of Begrebet Angest 
set into movement a tradition that now will be difficult to arrest, and yet 
when this work is revised (and it will have to be) the title (and the concept) 
will most certainly have to be changed to read: The Concept of Anxiety. 
‘Anxiety’ does not fully translate the original either (for it does not go far 
enough in intensity), but it at least permits of the various quantitative grada­
tions studied in Begrebet Angest, and is, moreover, a determinant known to 
modern psychology.
The book under discussion and The Sickness Unto Death constitute another, 
very special problem in terminology. These two works are in content profound 
studies in psychology, but being authored at a time when psychology was in 
its infancy, and when, therefore, a psychologic terminology as such for all 
practical purposes did not exist, the language employed by Kierkegaard has 
in itself been a detriment to proper research by competent psychologists. To 
this date, no such work exists. What is required here is a re-wording that 
would at the same time transpose Kierkegaard’s terminology into that which 
grew up during the early part of this century (with Freud, Adler, Jung, etc.), 
and entail a broadening of Kierkegaard’s “algebraically” described, psycho­
logical states; the scholar who embarks on this project will find himself 
writing several thick volumes but he will also be instrumental in giving a
further depth to modern knowledge of man. As things stand at the present, 
both works are all too often treated as systematic excercises in metaphysics 
and ontology.
The answer to the question of how Kierkegaard has fared in English would 
seem from the above almost to be that we ought to start from scratch. In truth 
the bulk of the existent translations will have to be revised, at least the 
Postscript, Concept of Anxiety (let us henceforth call it), Stages, Fear and 
Trembling, The Sickness Unto Death, Either ¡Or and Repetition; these, along 
with the Fragments represent the core of the authorship and must constitute 
a homogenous whole in terminology, if they are not simply to be the source 
of confusion. In the above, I have taken into account only the most important 
of those concepts that consistently have underlain confusion in translation, 
without giving space to such as Indesluttethed, Bestemmelse, Gud — Guden, 
in short, to the many words and expressions encountered by the English reader 
in the Prefaces, Introductions and Forewords to the works available to us; and 
yet many of them play significant rôles both for clarity and for style.
The final solution cannot be other than to follow the example of the 
Danes, Germans, French and Japanese and publish — under the direction of 
one editor — Kierkegaard’s collected works in English. This, however, is not 
to be expected in the immediate future, such a project being in direct conflict 
with our Anglo-Saxon mentality.
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